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COMMENTS
BRAGDON v. ABBOTT: A CASE OF HIV AS A
PERCEIVED DISABILITY UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
People with disabilities have faced systematic discrimination
in various facets of American life.' Negative attitudes towards
the disabled have been the basis for justifying disparate and ob-
jectionable treatment,2 and for isolating and segregating the dis-
abled from mainstream society.3 While discrimination has not
been completely eradicated, 4 both state5 and federal6 legislation
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994) "[Hlistorically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem[.]"); see also, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989) (testi-
mony of Judith Heumann, World Institute on Disability) (detailing life long personal
accounts of discrimination experienced "because of' disability).
2 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202 (1926) (discussing the merits of a state law
that was enacted to "prevent the reproduction of mentally defective people"). Justice
Holmes held that a Virginia act permitting forced sterilization of mentally disabled
patients in state institutions was constitutionally valid. See id. at 208. Salpingec-
tomy for the purposes of sterilization was determined to be appropriate for "those
who.., sap the strength of the State." Id. at 207. He later went on to state that "[ilt
is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. Justice Holmes reasoned that
"[tihree generations of imbeciles are enough." Id.
3 See Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of South Portland, 508 A.2d 948, 954
n.5 (Me. 1986) (describing treatment of the handicapped "as one of the country's
'shameful oversights,' which caused the handicapped to live among society 'shunted
aside, hidden, and ignored.' ") (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296
(1985)) (citations omitted).
4 See 42 U.S.C § 12101(a)(3) (1994) ("[Dliscrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommo-
dations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services[.]").
5 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592(1) (West Supp. 1998) ("It is unlaw-
ful public accommodations discrimination, in violation of this Act... [fior any public
accommodation.. .to directly or indirectly refuse... on account of... physical or
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have mandated a trend toward equality. The Americans with
Disabilities Act 7 ("ADA") is among the most sweeping and com-
prehensive legislation designated to protect the rights of those
that have a covered disability.8 Recently, however, the scope of
the ADA has been questioned.9 Cases regarding its applicability
to persons infected with the human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV") have been testing the limits and probing particular pro-
visions of the Act.10 In Abbott v. Bragdon," the United States
mental disability.., any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, serv-
ices or privileges of public accommodation, or in any manner discriminate against
any person .... ").
6 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability...
be subjected to discrimination under any program... receiving Federal financial
assistance .. ").
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994)
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (stating that the purpose is "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities"); see also Susan Moriarity Miltko, The Need for Profes-
sional Discretion: Health Professionals under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1731, 1744 (1995) ("Through its unprecedented specificity, scope, and
affirmative requirements, the ADA provides extensive new rights to millions of dis-
abled Americans."). See also Statement by President George Bush upon signing S.
933, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in Signing of
S.933, the Americans with Disabilities Act, PUB. L. NO. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C-AN.
601 (recording comments made by President Bush stating "[tihe Americans with
Disabilities Act represents the full flowering of our democratic principles, and it
gives me great pleasure to sign it into law today").
9 See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 167-69 (4th Cir. 1997)
(addressing whether asymptomatic HIV is considered a disability under the ADA);
Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-47 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (ad-
dressing whether the mere use of medicine such as insulin establishes a per se dis-
ability under the ADA); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 800-04 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (discussing whether infertility is a physical impairment under the ADA);
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (E.D La. 1995) (dis-
cussing whether a reproductive disorder substantially limits the major life activity of
working pursuant to the ADA); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310,
1316-23 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (addressing whether diagnosis of infection of EH for ap-
proximately one year constitutes a record of impairment within the meaning of the
ADA).
10 See Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co., 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1163-65 (M.D. Fla.
1997) (addressing whether HIV is a disability under ADA); United States v. Morvant
898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La. 1995) (discussing whether discrimination against
AIDS/HIV infected patients is a violation of the ADA); Kohn Nast & Graf, 862 F.
Supp. at 1319-23 (deciding whether the ADA covers HIV positive individuals); Howe
v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that IV is a disability under
the ADA). But see Runnenbaum, 123 F.3d at 169-70 (deciding that asymptomatic
HIV is not a physical impairment under the ADA).
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a plaintiff in-
fected with HIV, while in the asymptomatic stage of the disease,
is considered to have a "physical impairment that substantially
limits.. .a major life activity" under the ADA.12 On appeal, the
Supreme Court employed the same rationale but declined to con-
sider other, more applicable, definitions of disability available
under the ADA.'3
In Bragdon, the plaintiff was an HIV-positive woman who
had been infected for approximately nine years.14 She was
asymptomatic at the time the cause of action arose.15 The defen-
dant, a dentist, diagnosed the plaintiff with a cavity that needed
to be filled.16 Although he offered to perform the procedure, he
refused to treat the plaintiff in his office. The defendant claimed
that because the plaintiff was HIV- positive, she would have to be
treated in a hospital setting.17 Abbott did not agree to this type
of treatment and subsequently filed suit, claiming discrimination
under the ADA.18 The district court granted Abbott's claim for
summary judgment, 19 and the First Circuit affirmed.20 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari,21 vacated the judgment, and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.22
11 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
12 Id. at 942.
13 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998) (noting that, in light of
the conclusion that plaintiff is disabled under subsection (A) of the Act, the Court
"need not consider the applicability of subsections (B) or (C) ").
14 See id. at 2200.
15 See id. at 2201.
16 See id.
17 See id. Plaintiff indicated on her patient form that she was HIV positive and
defendant informed her that pursuant to his infectious disease policy, he would treat
her in a hospital setting. See id. Defendant told plaintiff that she would be charged
both the standard fee for filling a cavity, and for use of the hospital facilities. See id.
18 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
19 See id. at 595; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating that when "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law").
20 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir. 1997).
21 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997). The Court granted certiorari on
the following three questions:
1. Is reproduction a major life activity within the meaning of the Americans
with Disabilities Act... ?
2. Are asymptomatic individuals infected with HIV per se disabled within
the meaning of the ADA?
3. When deciding under title m of the ADA whether a private health care
provider must perform invasive procedure on an infectious patient in his
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [73:933
The case elicited a cacophony of opinions from the Justices.23
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy found that Abbott's infec-
tion was a physical impairment that substantially limited the
major life activity of reproduction.24 In reaching its decision, the
Court relied on federal regulations defining the ADA,28 as well as
congressional intent exhibited through the use of identical terms
in other similar legislation.26 The Court found reproduction to be
the affected major life activity.27 In arriving at this conclusion,
the Court afforded the term "major life activity" its plain mean-
ing.28
The language of the ADA requires an individualized assess-
ment to determine whether a certain condition is a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.29 This issue, however, was ex-
office, should courts defer to the health care provider's professional
judgment, as long as it is reasonable in light of then-current medical
knowledge?
1998 WL 4676 (U.S. Pet. Brief) (Jan. 7, 1998).
22 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213 (1998).
2 See id. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Kennedy. See id. at 2202.
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Breyer joined, and Jus-
tice Ginsburg filed her own concurrence. See id. at 2213. The Chief Justice filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, within which he was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 2214. Justice O'Connor joined the Chief Jus-
tice's concurrence in part and authored her own partial dissent. See id. at 2214,
2217.
24 See id. at 2205-06.
25 See id. at 2202; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1998) (defining physical or
mental impairment to "include [ ] ... such contagious... diseases.., as... HIV
disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic).. ,).
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994) (defining disabled individual using the exact
language that was adopted by the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1994) (using a defi-
nition of handicap in the Fair Housing Amendments that is identical to the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA). The Supreme Court notes that Congress's use of identical
statutory language implies that Congress intended the statutory term to be con-
strued in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretation. See Bragdon, 118
S. Ct. at 2202.
27 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (noting that "[we have little difficulty con-
cluding that [reproduction] is [a major life activity]").
28 See id.
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (stating that determination of disability will
be made with respect to an individual); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998)
(noting the importance of the individualized inquiry since "[slome impairments may
be disabling for particular individuals but not for others"); see also Ennis v. National
Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
provision defining disability mandates "that a finding of disability be made on an
individually-individual basis").
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plored only in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion.30
Thus, since the First Circuit also declined to rule whether per-
sonal affliction must be demonstrated in each case,31 the question
remains without a definitive answer.
The Court recognized that the defendant would not be liable
for discrimination under the ADA if the plaintiffs treatment
threatened the health or safety of others.32 It further noted that
Congress included the direct threat provision in the ADA to pro-
hibit the type of discrimination that results from fear and misin-
formation of contagion.33 It ultimately held that in assessing
30 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (noting the failure of the Court to discuss
whether reproduction was a major life activity for the plaintiff personally). Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "the ADA's definition of a 'disability' requires that the
major life activity at issue be one 'of such individual.'... [Tlhere is not a shred of
record evidence indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, respondent's
major life activities included reproduction.... ."Id.
31 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998).
32 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210. A public accommodation is not required to
allow a person to "participate in or benefit from... services ... of that public ac-
commodation when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others." 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a) (1998). "Direct threat," as understood under the ADA,
means "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary
aids or services." 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (1998) (emphasis in original).
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized as-
sessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical
knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the na-
ture, duration, and severity of the risk- the probability that the potential
injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies,
practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.
28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1998).
The First Circuit held that any determination based upon medical evidence is to
be confined to that evidence available at the time the service provider refuses treat-
ment. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 944. The First Circuit recognized that it was the prac-
tice for courts to defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.
See id. at 944-45 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288
(1986)). The Supreme Court fashioned a rule whereby courts should determine the
objective reasonableness of the views of health care professionals without deferring
to their individual judgments. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210. The conclusions of
public health authorities may be rebutted by persuasive evidence adduced from
other recognized experts in a given field. See id. at 2211.
'3 See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 943. There is a strong mandate for places of public ac-
commodation to serve all person regardless of disability. See 42 U.S.C § 12182(a)
(1994) (imposing the statute's general rule that "[n]o individual shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the... ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation..."). The First Circuit noted
1999]
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whether there is a direct threat, "courts should... [judge] the
objective reasonableness of the views of health care professionals
without deferring to their individual judgments,"3 4 and that a
health care professional may depart from generally accepted
norms by relying on a credible scientific basis for such devia-
tion.35 The Court remanded the disposition of this issue for de-
termination in accordance with this standard. The lower court
had to determine whether Dr. Bragdon raised a disputed issue of
material fact with respect to a direct threat.36
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court began with the lan-
guage of the ADA.37 The ADA gives a tripartite definition of dis-
ability,38 which is designed to afford broad protection.39 This
Comment asserts that while the Supreme Court properly con-
cluded that the plaintiff is an individual with a disability under
the ADA,40 it did not rely upon the correct provision of the ADA's
definition of disability. The Court erred in finding that the plain-
tiff was disabled as defined by the first prong of the ADA; it
should have more carefully considered the third prong.41 Sidney
that there are a few carefully delineated exceptions to liability when a place of public
accommodation does not extend its services to all persons regardless of disability.
See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 943 (stating a service provider is not required to serve a per-
son who" 'poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others'") (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(3) (1994).
3 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
35 See id. at 2211.
36 See id. at 2213 (remanding the case on the issue of direct threat because the
circuit court did not cite sufficient material in the record to determine, as a matter of
law, that respondent's HIV infection posed no direct threat to the health and safety
of others).
37 See id. at 2201.
38 Under the ADA, a disability can mean a "physical... impairment," having a
"record of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
39 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998) (noting that the definition in the Act has been afforded a broad meaning
in determining what in particular constitutes a disability); see also 45 C.F.R. pt. 84,
app. A at 334 (1998) (explaining that the absence of "a list of specific diseases and
conditions that constitute physical or mental impairments" is a result of "the diffi-
culty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such list"). The Department of
Health and Human Services declined to issue regulations that would narrow the
definition of the word disability. See id.
40 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2209.
41 See id. at 2201 ("We hold respondent's HIV infection was a disability under
subsection (A) of the definitional section of the statute. In light of this conclusion we
need not consider the applicability of subsections (B) or (C).").
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Abbott was refused treatment for a routine dental procedure.
This refusal was not because she was unable to reproduce suc-
cessfully,42 rather, it was premised upon the fear of her health
care provider. Discrimination resulting from fear or mispercep-
tion is governed by a different analysis under the ADA. More-
over, discrimination of this sort is unlawful under the Act, sub-
ject only to a narrowly tailored exception.43
This Comment further contends that while the Supreme
Court considered reproduction to be a major life activity, the
plaintiffs substantial limitation to engage in reproduction was
not the basis of the discrimination. Rather, her inability to expe-
rience full and equal treatment was the result of the dentist's
perception of her condition. Thus, she was "regarded as" having
an impairment and, as such, should have been deemed disabled
under the third part of the ADA.
I. THE COURT RELIED UPON THE INCORRECT
DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."44 Congress
crafted the definition of disability to encompass a broad group of
individuals who may be subject to discrimination and thus
should be afforded protection under the ADA.45 The Department
of Justice addressed the implications of the ADA on asympto-
matic HIV infected individuals and suggested an alternative ra-
tionale for holding HIV-positive individuals disabled under the
ADA.46
42 See id. at 2207 (noting that individuals infected with HIV cannot" 'engage in
the act of procreation with the normal expectation of bringing forth a healthy child'")
(quoting 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264,273 (1988)).
43 See infra Part I A.
44 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
45 See H.R. REP. No. 101485(1), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
332, 334-35. The legislative history suggests that the second and third provisions
adopted from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were intended to afford broad protec-
tion. Inclusion of the second provision is designed to protect one who has recovered
from a previous impairment, while the third provision is included to mitigate dis-
criminatory effects of those affected with stigmatic conditions. See id.
46 See Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the
1973 Rehabilitation Act to HV-Infected Persons, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1999]
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A. HIV Positive Status is an Impairment Under the ADA
The use of the word "impairment" is common in each of the
definitions of disability. Thus, some form of impairment is a pre-
requisite for coverage under the ADA47 The statute, however,
does not explicitly define impairment with regard to disability.48
In the absence of clear Congressional intent as to whether "im-
pairment" under the ADA includes HIV infection, the Court re-
lied on the construction given by the administrative agency re-
sponsible for its implementation.49 Additional support for the
conclusion that "impairment" includes HIV infection may be
found in the legislative history of the ADA,50 the Department of
405:1, at 405:7 (Sept. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Justice Department Memorandum] (ar-
guing that the limitation on reproduction is not based upon the physical effect of
being infected with HIV, but rather upon the "conscience or normative judgment of
the particular infected person"). The Justice Department observed "that there is
nothing inherent in the infection which actually prevents either procreation or inti-
mate relations." Id.
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
48 See id. Even though the statute contains no definition of impairment, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services has construed the term, as used in the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, upon which the ADA is based, to mean:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurologi-
cal; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech or-
gans; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1998).
49 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998) (noting that the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, the predecessor agency to the Department
of Health and Human Services, issued regulations defining the term "impairment"
in the context of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and that the defini-
tion of disability in the ADA is "drawn almost verbatim" from a similar provision in
the Rehabilitation Act); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[Ihf, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue... [and] if the statute is si-
lent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")
(footnote omitted).
50 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 450. Under the ADA's first definition of disability, a person "must have a physi-
cal or mental impairment," which Congress regarded as "any physiological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems:... reproductive... hemic and lymphatic .... " Ik The
House Report gives examples of such impairment. Among these is "infection with the
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Justice interpretative guidelines,51  the recommendation of
United States Surgeon General,5 2 as well as medical evidence
from the Center for Disease Control ("CDC"). 53 The word "im-
pairment," as understood by the above-mentioned sources, has a
specific meaning that is different from the plain meaning of the
word.5 4 The use of a special meaning makes the use of legislative
history acceptable. 55 The application of not only the legislative
history but of other relevant contemporary governmental and
medical sources is helpful in arriving at the proper conclusion in
the context of the ADA.56 The Supreme Court determined that
asymptomatic HJV constitutes an impairment by focusing upon
the manner and course of infection 57 and the debilitating effects
Human Immunodeficiency Virus." Id. at 451; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 19
(1989) (citing the need for "omnibus civil rights legislation" that should include "[all
persons with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection").
51 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (listing disorders falling within the meaning of
"disability" under the ADA, including"HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymp-
tomatic)"); see also supra note 39 (discussing the broad meaning given to the term
"disability" under the ADA).
52 See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 46, at 405:19 (citing a letter
from U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to Douglas Kmiec, Acting Assistant At-
torney General, in which Dr. Koop states that individuals in the early stage of HIV
infection experience "subclinical manifestations i.e., impairments and no visible
signs of illness"). The Surgeon General further stated that "from a purely scientific
perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly impaired." Id.
53 See Taunya Lovell Banks, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Re-
productive Rights of HIV-Infected Women, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 57, 62 (1994)
(stating that the Centers for Disease Control and the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology "recommend[ed] that women infected with HIV delay or forego
bearing children").
54 See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1997)
(noting that Webster's dictionary defines "impairment as 'deterioration! or 'lessening' ").
Compare id. with 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (defining impairment).
55 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Stat-
utes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 851 (1992) (stating that "[elven the strongest critics of
the use of legislative history concede that a court should take full account of any
special meaning that a statutory word may have"). But see Note, Why Learned Hand
Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1006
(1992) (observing that Justice Scalia believes legislative history should only be con-
sulted if "adhering to the apparent meaning of a statute produces an 'absurd' result")
(footnotes omitted).
56 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202-09 (1998).
57 See id. at 2203 ("Once a person is infected with HIV, the virus invades differ-
ent cells in the blood and in body tissues.").
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that the disease has on various body systems,58 even in its early
stages.
B. The Use of the Definition in Subsection (A) is Erroneous
in HIV Cases
"A physical or mental impairment does not constitute a dis-
ability under the first prong of the definition for purposes of the
ADA unless its severity is such that it results in a 'substantial
limitation of one or more major life activities.' "59 The Supreme
Court noted that while "[clonception and childbirth are not im-
possible for an HIV victim," 60 these life activities are clearly
"dangerous to the public health."61 The Court, however, held that
the standard for limitation under the ADA is any significant
limitation, not "utter inabilit[y]."62 This holding invites an inva-
sive type of discrimination that may encroach upon the rights of
those who are HIV positive.63 Additionally, the use of this rea-
soning places emphasis upon the infected individual's choice to
refrain from reproduction in reaction to the affliction, rather than
upon his or her actual capability.64 While the lower courts were
divided in their attempts to determine whether reproduction is
58 See id. (noting that the virus compromises the body's immune system, expos-
ing the victim to a deterioration of various body systems).
59 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(1), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
334.
60 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
61 Id.
62 Id. (noting that dangers of transmission of HIV to the partner of the infected
individual as well as the risk of perinatal transmission impose restrictions upon vic-
tims of HIV that are significant enough to qualify for statutory coverage).
63 See Banks, supra note 53, at 65. Proponents of discouraging women against
reproduction are arguably violating "at least the spirit of the ADA because they
impermissibly interfere with the reproductive freedom of women with a protected
disability." Id.
64 See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 46, at 405:7 (asserting that
the limitation of reproduction is not based upon the physical effect of the impair-
ment but rather upon the "conscience or normative judgment of the particular in-
fected person and life activities"). The Justice Department concluded that "it might
be asserted that there is nothing inherent in the infection which actually prevents
either procreation or intimate relations." Id. In issuing this opinion, the Department
of Justice relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's opinion in School Board. of Nas-
sau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), which construed the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 46, at 405:1.
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considered a major life activity,65 the Supreme Court had "little
difficulty concluding that it is."66 In holding that reproduction is
a major life activity, the Court based its inquiry upon the fact
that reproduction is "central to the life process itself."67 Reliance
solely upon this rationale is a mistake, which may lead to an im-
permissible and unmanageable extension of the ADA.68 Another
problem with this holding is the danger of precluding coverage to
prospective plaintiffs for whom reproduction is undesirable or
impossible.69
65 See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1997)
(stating that reproduction is not a major life activity contemplated by the ADA);
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (stating
that "[rieproduction is not an activity engaged in with the same degree of frequency
as the listed activities" adopted by the regulations pursuant to the ADA). The court
in Zatarian observed that while "[a] person is required to walk, see, learn, speak,
breath, and work throughout the day, day in and day out [,] ... a person is not called
upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day." Id. But see Doe v. Kohn Nast &
Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding that the language of
the ADA "does not preclude procreating as a major life activity, but may well include
it"); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding
that reproduction can be a "major life activity under the ADA"); Cain v. Hyatt, 734
F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (interpreting Pennsylvania state law provisions,
which were taken verbatim from regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA, and
concluding that HTV infection is a "significant injury to the reproductive system
[which] impedes a major life activity").
66 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist opined
that while the majority focused upon the plain meaning of "major" as "comparative
importance," it failed to consider the alternate definition of "major," that is, "greater
in quantity, number, or extent." Id. at 2215 (citations omitted). The Chief Justice
noted that while decisions regarding reproduction are of importance in a person's
life, they are not of the sort intended to be protected under the Act, which is limited
to "activities [that] are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day exis-
tence of a normally fimctioning individual." Id. "Respondent's argument, taken to its
logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for some de-
bilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some possible future effects." Id.
It would appear that, the Court has not precluded the interpretation that all physi-
cal body functions may constitute a major life activity, since all systems of the body,
properly operative, are central to life.
69 See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal
Impact of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,35-36 (1997)
("[TIhe protection for asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals might be quite hap-
hazard at best and depends on a circumstance-the plaintiffs fertility and reproduc-
tive intentions-that really has nothing to do with the discrimination at issue.").
While Ms. Abbott asserted that reproduction was an important endeavor for her
prior to her diagnosis, this will not always be the case. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (noting plaintiffs tes-
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II. THE THIRD PRONG OF THE ADA DEFINITION OF
DISABILITY IS APPROPRIATE FOR
HIV-POSITIVE INDIVIDUALS
A. The "Direct Threat" Exception to the ADA
Congress crafted the "direct threat" exception to the ADA as
a public safety exception to the broad protection provided by the
Act.70 Under this provision, a public accommodation escapes li-
ability under the ADA if it would be hazardous or similarly im-
prudent to deal with an infected individual.71 A significant risk,
determined by "medical or other objective evidence," must exist,
however, in order to justify unequal treatment.72 Thus, even a
physician's good faith belief that an HIV-positive patient poses a
risk of contagion does not excuse discriminatory treatment. 73 In
light of these considerations the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the First Circuit to determine whether filling Ms. Abbott's
cavity would pose a significant risk to the "health or safety" of ei-
ther Dr. Bragdon or his staff.74
On remand the court reexamined the evidence and deter-
mined that "treatment of the kind that Ms. Abbott required [is]
safe, if undertaken using universal precautions."75 The First Cir-
cuit determined that both the dentistry guidelines formulated by
timony that "HIV ended her consideration of having a family"). It is unclear how the
courts will react when an HIV infected plaintiff has no intention to reproduce, when
the plaintiff chooses to reproduce with knowledge of HIV infection, or when the
plaintiff is unable to reproduce regardless of HIV infection. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct.
at 2205 (remarking that while the discussion in the case is limited to reproduction as
the major life activity that is substantially limited by asymptomatic HIV, there was
"little doubt that had different parties brought the suit they would have maintained
that an HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life activities").
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994) (defining direct threat as "a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of poli-
cies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services").
71 See id.
72 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
73 See id. (stating that a physician "receives no special deference simply because
he [or she] is a health care professional").
74 See id. at 2213.
75 Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1998) cert. denied, Bragdon v. Ab-
bott, 119 S.Ct. 1805 (1999)..
[73:933
HIVAS A PERCEIVED DISABILITY
the CDC as well as the ADA policy on AIDS submitted by the
plaintiff have sufficient scientific foundation to justify the court's
reliance upon them, in compliance with the Supreme Court's re-
mand.76 Since there has been no finding of any direct threat of
transmission of HIV,7 it becomes evident that Dr. Bragdon's
"policy" regarding Ms. Abbott and those similarly situated was
created and maintained out of ignorance and fear. This type of
"policy" is impermissible under the third prong of the ADA defi-
nition of disability. It is this part of the definition that should
control.
B. Absent a Direct Threat, the "Regarded As" Language Protects
HIV Infected Individuals
The express terms of the ADA provide a sufficient basis to
establish HIV infected individuals as a protected class.78 The
language crafted for the ADA definition of disability was bor-
rowed in its entirety from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 79 thus
implying that the same standards are applicable.80 Federal
regulations 81 and legislative history8 2 expounded upon the appro-
priate use of the third prong of the definition of disability thereby
establishing its validity in cases of HIV infected individuals.8 3
The "regarded as" language is integral in expanding the rights of
76 See id. ("[WMe are confident that we appropriately relied on the [gluidelines
and the [plolicy.").
77 See id. ("[No public health authority... had issued warnings to health care
providers... [regarding] HIV-positive patients.").
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining disability to include "being re-
garded as having... an impairment").
79 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp 797, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (not-
ing Congress's intention that general caselaw applicable to the Rehabilitation Act be
applicable to the ADA by its adoption of "the definition of 'disability' from the Reha-
bilitation Act definition of the term 'individual with handicaps' ").
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994) ("[Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title.") (citation omitted).
81 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (1998) (defining disability with respect to an indi-
vidual as, "[bleing regarded as having... an impairment").
82 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 335 (1990), reprinted in Americans with
Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C-.AN 335 ("[a] person who is...
discriminated against, because of a covered entity's negative attitudes toward that
person's impairment is treated as having a disability.").
83 See id. (explaining that the "third prong" pertains to "individuals with stig-
matic conditions that are viewed as... impairments").
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disabled individuals, in that it includes among its protected class
those who are mistreated by society based solely upon a misper-
ception of impairment.84 The language is particularly applicable
when a person has an impairment that does not adversely affect
him or her to the degree of a substantial limitation, yet the indi-
vidual is treated in a manner that substantially limits his or her
equal access to or enjoyment of certain covered entities or services.85
Since Congress has not explicitly defined the "regarded as"
phrase in the legislation, it is helpful to interpret the language in
light of Congress's purpose.86 While the Supreme Court declined
to rule upon the "regarded as" language specifically,87 its ration-
ale in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline88 provides a use-
ful statutory framework.8 9 In Arline, the Court considered the
inclusion of this phrase to be a clear sign of Congress's intent to
include those who fall prey to "society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease" within the protection of the
84 See id. The Report states that the third prong includes all of the following-
[Ain individual who has physical or mental impairment that does not sub-
stantially limit a major life activity, but that is treated by a covered entity
as constituting such a limitation[,] ... an individual who has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major activity only as a re-
sult of the attitudes of others toward such impairment or has no physical or
mental impairment but is treated by a covered entity as having such an
impairment.
Id.
85 See id. (protecting people who have certain conditions that "are viewed as
physical impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial limitation of a major
life activity"); see also Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d
538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that people who suffer from impairments that are
not disabling may still be shunned because others believe that they are nevertheless
disabled); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1448-49 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (finding that the "regarded as disabled" test was "designed to protect against
erroneous stereotypes... regarding certain physical or mental impairments that are
not substantially limiting in fact").
86 See Breyer, supra note 55, at 853 ("A court often needs to know the purpose a
particular statutory word or phrase serves within the broader context of a statutory
scheme in order to decide properly whether a particular circumstance falls within
the scope of that word or phrase.").
87 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
88 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see also Judicial Department Memorandum, supra note
46, at 405:7 ("[Ciourts may choose to pass over such factual questions since the Su-
preme Court has stated an alternative rationale for finding a life activity limitation
based on the reaction of others to the infection.").
89 The ADA uses the same "regarded as" test set forth in the regulations imple-
menting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(k)(2)(iv) (1998).
[73:933
9IVAS A PERCEIVED DISABILITY
ADA.90 The Court found that these individuals are thus subject
to effects that are just as "handicapping as are the physical limi-
tations that flow from actual impairment,"91 especially when the
"fear and misapprehension" is of contagion.92
Interpretative guidelines such as those issued by the Justice
Department illustrate congressional purpose.93 The Department
explains that the perception of the public accommodation is a
"key element of this test". 4 and may be the sole reason for the
finding of a disability under the third prong of the ADA defini-
tion.95 Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion delineates three instances when the third prong would be
applicable to impose liability on an employer for discrimination
on the basis of disability.96
90 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; see id. at 279 (stating that the statutory language "re-
flected Congress' concern with protecting the handicapped against discrimination
stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from 'archaic attitudes and laws'
and from the 'fact that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensi-
tive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps' ") (alteration in
original) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974)).
91 Id. at 284. "The Nation as a whole will benefit from the removal of the attitu-
dinal and physical barriers that now prevent... Americans who have physical and
mental impairments from fully capitalizing on the opportunities that this great
country offers .... [Ilt is time that this Nation eradicate the irrational fears and
misconceptions about the disabled." 136 CONG. REC. S9693 (daily ed. July 13, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Reigle).
92 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; see also United States v. Happy Time Day Care Cen-
ter, 6 F. Supp.2d 1073, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 1998) ("The common theme that emerges
from these allegations is that the decisions made by each defendant.., were driven
by society's myths and fears about the contagious nature of HIV and AIDS"); Doe v.
Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Surely
no physical problem has created greater public fear and misapprehension than
AIDS. That fear includes a perception that a person with AIDS is substantially im-
paired in his ability to interact with others .... ").
93 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.103(a) (1998); see also Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (noting that
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services were
formulated with the "oversight and approval of Congress"). These regulations were
intended to be applicable to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S. Ct. 2196, 2198 (1998). The ADA provides, in part, that the Act is intended to
be construed according to at least the same standard as that of the Rehabilitation
Act or "the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to [the Rehabilitation
Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
94 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B. at 584 (1998).
95 See id. (explaining that "[a] person would be covered under this test if a res-
taurant refused to serve that person because of a fear of 'negative reactions' of others
to that person").
93 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1)(1)-(3) (1998).
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When interpreting the "regarded as" language, the lower
federal courts 97 have adhered to the Arline rationale. In addi-
tion, at least one state court noted Arline's applicability con-
cerning the coverage of the "regarded as" language.98 Clearly,
this is the most appropriate rationale to apply to HIV cases,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic. HIV infected patients
may not suffer substantial physical limitations in major life ac-
tivities as a result of their impairment,99 but they are the objects
of discrimination based on unsubstantiated fears of the commu-
nity at large.00 Their affliction leads to disparate and negative
treatment by society because of its misconceptions about the ori-
gins of the disease and the class of persons infected. 0 1 They tend
to be isolated and shunned from the community from the begin-
97 See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 678-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (resolving the is-
sue of whether HIV is a disability under a Pennsylvania statute modeled alter the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
98 See Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 817 (W. Va.
1990). The court in Benjamin R. listed HIV cases that could have been appropriately
decided using the third prong of the definition of disability. See id. (citing Baxter v.
City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 725, 729 (S.D. IlM. 1989) (noting that HPIV could
be a perceived handicap "within [the] third part of the definition of 'handicap,' in-
volving a person who is 'regarded as' having such an impairment... due to un-
founded fear of contagion from casual contact"); Lecklet v. Board of Comm'rs of
Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 & n.4 (E.D. La. 1989) (stating that HIV
also could qualify as a perceived handicap); Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1275-76 (Mass. 1986) (noting that HIV may be a per-
ceived handicap).
99 See supra Part I; see also Craig V. Towers, MD et al., A Bloodless Cesarean
Section and Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 179 AM.
J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 708-14 (1998) (noting that the use of drugs such as Zidovudine
and other antiretroviral agents can decrease risk of vertical transmission of the dis-
ease to about 5 percent). This indicates that the prospect of producing a healthy off-
spring is increasing through advances in medical science and that this "substantial
limitation" is likewise decreasing. Id.
100 See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 680 ("Yet, despite authoritative medical evidence to
the contrary, fully one-third of the American population believes 'AIDS is as conta-
gious, or more contagious, than the common cold.' ") (quoting Note, The Constitu-
tional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1274 n.6 (1986)).
101 See id. ("The particular associations AIDS shares with sexual fault, drug use,
social disorder, and with racial minorities, the poor, and other historically disenfran-
chised groups accentuates the tendency to visit condemnation upon its victims"); see
also Poveromo-Spring v. Exxon Corp., 968 F. Supp. 219, 228 (D.N.J. 1997) (describ-
ing the stigma attached to AIDS as "unparalleled by any other disease"); Banks, su-
pra note 53, at 61 ("As a class, women with HIV and AIDS are seen as irresponsible
women whose voluntary conduct is responsible for their condition and as inappro-
priate parents because of their drug use or association with drug users.").
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ning of their disease until the agonizing end.102 It was precisely
this type of stigmatization and isolation that Congress sought to
mitigate and prevent with passage of the ADA. 10 3
It appears that a rationale premised on the third prong of
the ADA is appropriate in the context of HIV plaintiffs. Such a
rationale gives effect to both the specific language of the statute
and the intention of the legislature. It is submitted that the Su-
preme Court should have relied upon this reasoning in its dispo-
sition of Bragdon v. Abbott.1° The defendant's denial of service
in his office, a place of public accommodation, and thus a covered
entity under the ADA,10 5 was based upon the plaintiffs "infec-
tious disease."106 This policy reflected his perception of plaintiffs
condition, based upon insufficient medical evidence, 10 7 that was
the impetus for his discriminatory conduct. He feared that the
plaintiff "posed a medically significant risk to his health or
102 See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679 (noting that "AIDS has engendered such preju-
dice and apprehension that its diagnosis typically signifies a social death as concrete
as the physical one which follows").
103 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7-8 (1989) ("Discrimination also includes harm
affecting individuals with a history of disability, and those regarded by others as
having a disability... [and such discrimination is often] based on false presump-
tions, generalizations, misperceptions, . . . irrational fears, and pernicious mytholo-
gies."). The Report goes on to cite instances of discrimination based on a person's
disability and its effects on others. "For example... the story of a New Jersey zoo
keeper who refused to admit children with Downs Syndrome because he feared they
would upset the chimpanzees." Id. Further, they relate a case in which the court
ruled that a child with cerebral palsy who was not a physical threat and was aca-
demically competitive, was excluded from public school, because his teacher claimed
his physical appearance made his classmates nauseous. See id.
The Report concludes that the "critical goal" of the ADA is "to allow individuals
with disabilities to be part of the economic mainstream of our society." Id. at 10.
104 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (stating "[n]o individual shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the...
services ... of any place of public accommodation."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)
(1994) (listing "professional office of a health care provider" among public accommo-
dations).
10 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d. 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998) (informing plaintiff that due to his infectious disease policy, defendant
could not treat her in his dental office and would only fill the cavity in a hospital set-
ting).
107 See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (stating
that reasonable medical judgments should be made based upon the state of medical
knowledge about "the nature of the risk... the duration of the risk ... the severity
of the risk... [and] the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm).
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safety"108 and, therefore, he restricted her equal access to health
care. The third prong of the definition was created to prohibit
this type of conduct.109 As a result, the defendant is liable for
discrimination under the ADA. The third prong of the definition
is consistent with our nation's recent history of legislation aimed
at reducing discrimination based upon stereotypes and misin-
formation.11 0 Persons infected with HIV in the asymptomatic
stage have not been proven to be limited in any major life activ-
ity. The only, and by far greatest, limitation is that placed upon
them by the misinformed and perhaps misguided public.
CONCLUSION
In reaching its conclusion based upon the first prong of the
definition of disability, the Supreme Court engaged in precisely
the type of fact-finding that the Department of Justice referred to
as unnecessary and that the Court indicated in Arline would be
phased out. A policy that treats HIV infected individuals as
having a disability because of limitations will do little to help
them overcome the discrimination they face as a result of their
affliction. By holding the public accountable, and other covered
entities liable for discrimination under the third prong of the
definition of disabled, the courts will send a much needed signal
that HIV-positive Americans are substantially limited only in the
manner in which they are treated by the uninformed and the
frightened.
Denise DeCell
'08 Abbott, 107 F.3d. at 949.
109 See generally 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(4) (1998).
110 "Twenty-six years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
barred discrimination based on race, religion, national origin and gender, we... will
bar discrimination against one of the nation's largest minority groups-the Ameri-
cans with disabilities." 136 CONG. REC. H66, 2625 (daily ed. May 22,1990) (state-
ment of Mr. Morrison).
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